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Background: Policies generate accountability in that they offer a standard against which government performance
can be assessed. A central question of this study is whether ideological imprint left by policy is realized in the time
following its adoption. National mental health policy expressly promotes the notion of deinstitutionalization, which
mandates that individuals be cared for in the community rather than in institutional environments.
Methods: We investigate whether mental health policy adoption induced a transformation in the structure of
mental health systems, namely psychiatric beds, using panel data on 193 countries between 2001 and 2011.
Results: Our striking regression results demonstrate that late-adopters of mental health policy are more likely to
reduce psychiatric beds in mental hospitals and other biomedical settings than innovators, whereas they are less
likely than non-adopters to reduce psychiatric beds in general hospitals.
Conclusions: It can be inferred late adopters are motivated to implement deinstitutionalization for technical
efficiency rather than social legitimacy reasons.
Keywords: Diffusion of innovation, Institutional theory, Governance, Mental health policyBackground
Countries that subscribe to international norms and
ideas of progress and advancement uphold them in na-
tional health policies. Even when policies are ratified,
national governments frequently fail to implement their
terms and conditions. Why? Problems with implementing
policies are especially pronounced due to institutional
inertia, which is manifested in heated parliamentary deli-
berations and legislative proceedings. A whole host of
other sociopolitical forces are at play during the im-
plementation of health reform, such as cultural cleavages,
resource availability, and the extent of political or legal
infrastructure development. In this study, we are inte-
rested in whether deinstitutionalization policy galvanizes a
revolution in the organization of national mental heath
systems. Deinstitutionalization policy is a policy that man-
dates a shift in practice of caring for individuals with* Correspondence: Gordon.shen@yale.edu
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article, unless otherwise stated.mental illness from institutional environments to the
community. Institutionalization is a social process by
which structures, policies, practices, and programs are
instilled with enough value such that they first acquire
social legitimacy, are normatively and cognitively held
in place by members of the world society, become
taken-for-granted by the collective, and ultimately achieve
a “rule-like” status ([1-3]: 25, [4]). We argue that the
institutionalization of deinstitutionalization policy is a
two-fold process: isomorphism may be observed in the
adoption of mental health policy across countries (first
stage), but not necessarily in the make-up of state
administrative apparatus and health care infrastructure
(second stage) [5,6]. Thus, the objective of this study is
to empirically examine whether the institutionalization
of deinstitutionalization policy changed the supply of
psychiatric beds in 193 countries from 2001 to 2011a.
Public policies are broad statements of intentions and
general directions their writers wish to undertake. They
may also outline methods and principles that politicians,
professional and industry groups, and other constituenciesCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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however, are not always complemented with local catch-
ment area and organization plans, funding, programs,
personnel, and regulations. Deinstitutionalization is a
major, yet broad component of national mental health
policies. The United Nations [7] and WHO [8] have
both declared that mental health care should be shifted
from hospital- to community-based treatment facilities.
Deinstitutionalization is fundamentally an administrative
philosophy rather than a technical advancement, so va-
riances found in its implementation among countries
invoke social legitimacy and cost-effectiveness impetuses
behind policy change [9-11]. We test both the external
legitimacy and internal efficiency hypotheses using the
World Health Organization’s (WHO)Mental Health Atlas,
a country-level panel dataset of mental health systems.
The pattern of policy diffusion reflets countries’ readiness
for change and propensity to take political risks. Tracing
the sigma-curve of innovation diffusion, a few early-
adopters (“innovators”) are followed by a critical mass of
late-adopters (“laggards”) and non-adopters (“resisters”)
[12]. The phase of policy adoption lends itself as a pre-
dictor of mental health system change. Laggards are of
particular interest to us because it is equally plausible for
such countries to hold either a legitimacy or efficiency
motivation in adopting deinstitutionalization. Institutional
theorists assert that early adopters assume a certain
organizational form because they are motivated by eco-
nomic and technical needs, whereas late adopters conform
because they are chiefly concerned with status enhance-
ment [3,13]. As such, actions of late-adopting countries
reinforce the bandwagon effect because they are sus-
ceptible to norms institutionalized in the world society
[14-16]. Proponents of the legitimacy side, however, often
fail to recognize bureaucrats and technocrats’ ability to
purposefully and creatively applying knowledge gained
from earlier adopters [17]. With sufficient resources and
stewardship, late adopters have the potential to implement
a policy innovation such that efficiency gains are rea-
lized from policy adoption opportunities. Late-adopting
countries could customize off the shelf policies so that
treatment, preventive, and rehabilitation services can
eventually be delivered at the mental health system’s
optimal capacity.
This article is organized as follows. In the Theoretical
background section we will review the relevant literature
that support our interpretation of late-adopting nation-
states’ behavior as being driven by internal efficiency or
external legitimacy motivation. In the Methods section,
we will give a brief overview on deinstitutionalization in
the 21st century, then lay out our plan to test the two
competing hypotheses using the WHO Mental Health
Atlas and other secondary datasets. The results will be




Are mental health systems designed for efficiency or le-
gitimacy reasons? Realists believe behavioral consisten-
cies reflect inherent needs and interests. Rational choice
theorists, in particular, consider nation-states as rational,
unitary actors who are actualizing fixed preferences
[18-20]. As such, there is a distinct economic rationale
underlying policy adoption lag: policymakers valorize
deinstitutionalization because it is instrumental in cut-
ting the exorbitant cost of delivering mental health care
in residential facilities and hospitals.
The mechanisms underlying policy adoption and imple-
mentation differ for early- versus late-adopters. Countries
that are innovators in mental health care tend to face two
dilemmas. Early on in the diffusion process, they face a
lack of information: not all policy alternatives are known
and the merits of the ones known are uncertain. The gen-
eral lack of information about the cost of all policy options
and the benefits of their concomitant solutions hampers
governments’ ability to make rational decisions. Govern-
ments can only make predictions on the equity, quality,
and efficiency implications of deinstitutionalization policy
based on their own experience with reforming the general
health sector.
Alternatively, early adopters with slack resources may
invest them in experiments involving the reorganization
of mental health system on a trial and error basis
[21,22]. Government stakeholders and special interest
groups associated with the experiments have a large
stake in their outcomes, so therein lies a chance that the
test population of citizens are exploited in the process of
carrying out the experiments [23,24]. Another trade-off
early adopters make once they embark on such an irre-
versible course of action is surrendering option value,
or the benefit that incurs from delaying a decision to
conduct experiments. High sunk costs are incurred if
deinstitutionalization proves to be a failure because the
political or financial price of reversing it is exceedingly
high, or because the policy itself cannot be easily un-
done once enacted. On the upside, investment in pilots
could pay off in dividends if pilot results are used to in-
crementally improve mental health systems. Pioneers in
mental health care stand to reap the benefits of discov-
ering new norms and practices in the form of increased
technical know how and regional influenceb.
Late adopters are risk averse and tend to learn from
earlier adopters. The option value of decision-making is
at its highest early on in the policy diffusion process,
and so forbearance or waiting becomes the default
strategy for decision makers concerned with risks [25].
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affected by both the availability of and access to an evi-
dence base of mental health policy’s effectiveness as it
has been tested at home or abroad [12,26-29]. To them,
early-adopting jurisdictions are perceived to be laborator-
ies, test sites, loci of experiments, pilots, and demonstra-
tion projects that produce technical information pertaining
to an innovative policy [30,31]. Policy-makers in late-
adopting countries are thus the target audience of at least
three types of research -clinical efficacy, cost-effectiveness,
and policy research- produced in early-adopting jurisdic-
tions [32]. Another complicating factor is access to scant
evidence on deinstitutionalization nationally and globally;
a 10/90 divide exists between developed and developing
countries on accessibility to comparative studies on men-
tal health services, programs, and policies [33,34]. Any ef-
forts taken to learn about natural experiments occurring
elsewhere or pilots taking place at home would mediate
the relationship between policy adoption and bed changes.
This is a key factor believed to result in cross-national
variation on the timing of policy adoption.
In sum, uncertainty and information asymmetry about
mental health policy are expected to decrease over the
life cycle of its adoption across countries [35,36]. As
countries gaining experience with deinstitutionalization
continues to proliferate, its concomitant practices
would spread through channels as diverse as inter-
national organizations, advocacy networks, consulting
companies, academic meetings, dignitary visits and
study tours ([37]: 367–368, [38]). Factual information
on deinstitutionalization would not only serve as an
aid in political debates and policymaking process, but
also facilitate the adoption of a broad concept like
deinstitutionalization to serve local needs, circum-
stances, and preferences. The option value and sunk
cost both decrease over the adoption cycle, which
suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Late adopters of mental health policy are
more likely than early adopters to gradually reduce the
number of psychiatric beds within their country.
If we observe a steeper rate of institution-based care
downsizing among late- than early-adopting countries,
then we can infer that the former adopted mental health
policy for internal efficiency reasons. More pointedly, if
policy-makers ratified the deinstitutionalization compo-
nent of mental health policy for efficiency reasons, then
we expect a decrease in the number of psychiatric beds
nationally during our decade-long study periodc.
External legitimacy
Constructivists and realists have long disagreed on
whether culture should be factored into the conceptualmodel of policy adoption and implementation. Construc-
tivists challenge realists’ assumption of purposive rational-
ity in organizational behavior. In Hall’s seminal study on
the diffusion of Keynesian ideas, he noted, “the process
whereby one policy paradigm comes to replace another is
likely to be more sociological than scientific” ([39]: 280).
Neo-institutional theorists, in particular, argue that orga-
nizations routinely follow taken-for-granted models, stan-
dards, and myths found in the institutional environment,
regardless of their functional utility [1,4]. Organizations
gain legitimacy by incorporating elements of widely ac-
cepted cultural models into their structures and proce-
dures [1,40,41]. Extrapolated to a macro level, countries
are products of social norms, and so their action can be
explained by logics of appropriateness in vogue in the
world society [42,43]. Ideas of the wider environment
shape sovereign states’ social structures and regulatory be-
havior through implicit or explicit rules. And states help
legitimate scripts in a cyclical manner following the neo-
institutional argumentd. Supranational institutions (e.g.
WHO) and peer states independently or jointly influence
a focal country’s behavior through models, standards,
rules, and myths [40,44-46]. As countries come to em-
body the same beliefs systems, their national identities
are morphing, and their interests become shared
through embedded exchanges with other actors in the
international community. This socialization and habi-
tualization process gives rise to a culture within the
world society [46-48].
We invoke constructivist logic for the second foci of
this study, which questions whether countries adopt
mental health policy in order to enhance their legitimacy
on the global stage. If this is the case, psychiatric beds
would continue to accommodate patients in need of
extended treatment even if those rotating in and out of
these beds are better served by their families and in the
community. Administrative structures created in response
to technical demands have previously been demonstrated
to be routinely decoupled from policy demands in educa-
tion [49,50], welfare [51] and human rights [52,53]. The
common explanation cutting across these domains is that
policies were ratified as symbolic gestures. Policies thus
“lose their bite,” or become obsolete, if the government is
the sole actor in charge of policy implementation and no
enforcement or accountability mechanisms are in place to
monitor the extent of policy implementation [1,35,53,54].
The phase of adoption poses as an additional considera-
tion in our study of mental health policy implementation.
Efficiency gains sought after by early adopters are gradually
displaced by normative pressure to adopt isomorphic prac-
tices, forms, and policies among those remaining in the
study population [1,55]. Tolbert and Zucker found that
early adopters of civil service reforms were motivated by
technical or economic needs of city governments, whereas
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of these programs as taken-for-granted improvements to
administrative apparatus [3]. Their hypothesis has since
been empirically tested for the cases of adoption of
personnel administration programs [56], CEO long-term
incentive plans [57], Total Quality Management [58], drug
abuse treatment units [59], and equal opportunity employ-
ment laws [60], What are the salient explanations arising
from these studies? Late adopters can economize on
search costs by imitating the actions of prior adopters
[61]. They are less likely to conceive of a feasible way to
actualize policy innovations, especially if they do not have
the R&D (research and development) capacity. Finally,
rapid spread of mental health reforms puts increasing
pressure on laggards to jump on the bandwagon in order
to avoid the stigma of appearing anachronistic [62-65].
We pose Tolbert and Zucker’s original hypothesis for
deinstitutionalization practices across countries as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Late adopters of mental health policy are
less likely than early adopters to gradually reduce the
number of psychiatric beds within their country.
Our legitimacy hypothesis predicts that reduced variety
would be observed in mental health policies, but variance
would remain in the composition of mental health sys-
tems when comparing WHO member countries.
As the legitimacy of deinstitutionalization grows in the
world polity, governments feel increasing pressure to
comply with international norms and to ratify that par-
ticular component of mental health policy so as to not
appear as a deviant country. Late adopters are more
likely to treat deinstitutionalization as a social fact of
health care reform rather than adopt it because it is
compatible with intra-country circumstances [1,3,4,66].
Decision makers in later adopting countries seek to
enhance their legitimacy, credibility, and reputation by
importing advanced policy innovations. To them, up-
holding a mental health policy could also act as a de-
monstration of modernity, shield for inaction, or veneer
to cover up corruption ([53,67]: 125). Adopting policy
may additionally boost the public’s opinion and interest
groups’ support of the national government, especially
during an electoral cycle. The act of adoption itself, how-
ever, does not necessarily compel the national government
to decrease the number of beds in psychiatric facilities,
which is really the essence of deinstitutionalization. If
so, late adopters would demonstrate no change in
psychiatric bed rates during our decade-long study
period compared to early adopters. The institutionalization
of deinstitutionalization is rendered superficial if it
stops short at policy adoption and does not penetrate
any deeper into the transformation of mental health
systems.Methods
Context
The mental health sector is a fitting empirical context
for us to test the two competing hypotheses about moti-
vations behind policy adoption because the design of
national mental health systems is subjected to strong
functional demands and to principles legitimated in the
world society [68,69]. Deinstitutionalization is one of the
major milestones in the care of people with mental,
neurological, and substance use (MNS) disorders in the
second half of the twentieth century. It is construed as
an administrative apparatus that is designed to prevent
chronic disability, uphold human rights, and reduce the
cost of care [70].
Deinstitutionalization started gaining momentum in
the 1950’s. As the deinstitutionalization process un-
folded, however, policy planners and healthcare pro-
viders in North America and Western Europe began to
realize the unanticipated consequences of this revolution
in the mental health field. The deinstitutionalization
movement is deemed successful if one focuses only on
the benchmarks found in administrative datasets, typi-
cally used for reimbursement purposes, or in census of
mental health facilities: closure of hospitals and asylums;
cuts in the number of beds; decrease in rates of inpatient
admission, bed rotation factor, average length of stay,
and number of residents [71-74]. Yet, many countries
continue to rely on mental hospitals as the main hubs of
mental health care. Oftentimes they are not well main-
tained, resulting in patients having to live in squalid and
deplorable conditions [75]. Psychiatric facilities may not
even be fully equipped with medical equipment and
basic amenities such as toilets, beds, and personal space.
Staff-to-patient ratios are low in these facilities, partly
owed to the global mental health workforce shortage,
making it unlikely patients receive high quality care and
individual attention [76]. Last, patients who reside in
mental hospitals are segregated from society due to
social stigma from the public, abandonment by their
families, and the remote locations of hospitals.
Community-based care is considered to be more hu-
mane, higher quality and more cost-effective compared
to institution-based care [77-79]e. Custodial services
provided by large institutions -most evidently mental
hospitals and asylums- are only justified for a small pro-
portion of patients with severe and chronic mental dis-
orders. Patients with a protracted tenure in psychiatric
facilities often have been there since signs and symptoms
of their illness manifested during early childhood or ado-
lescence [80-82]f. Mental health care incurs exorbitant
costs because of both the severity and chronicity of cer-
tain conditions. Patients of community-based treatment
facilities fare better than patients of inpatient treatment
on various outcome measures, such as relapse rate, delay
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to medication intake, number of admissions to inpatient or
residential facilities, homelessness, illicit substance use, and
criminal involvement [83,84]. National governments are
confronted with a two-fold challenge of managing this
population’s chronic disorder and sustaining their liveli-
hood in the community. The trick for governments is to
find a judicious mix of community, outpatient, and in-
patient servicesg.
The lack of synchronicity in closing or downsizing
institution-based services with scaling-up community-
based services has engendered a whole host of problemsh.
A sudden and abrupt reduction in psychiatric beds has re-
sulted in the inadvertent transfer of patients to psychiatric
units in general hospitals [85], nursing homes [86], house-
holds [87], supported housing [88], and prisons [89-91].
This is observed in the wake of “trans-institutionalization,”
or the act of transferring patients from mental hospitals to
other institutions such as homeless shelters, custodial in-
stitutions, and prisons [92,93]. Recent research further
suggests a nascent, reflexive trend in Europe towards the
“re-institutionalization” of care, marked by the rising
number of supported housing facilities, forensic psychi-
atric beds and penitentiaries (e.g. correctional facilities,
jails, prisons), in addition to existing asylums, mental
hospitals and private clinics [94-97]. The experiences of
all early policy adopter countries converge on one sa-
lient point: if the process of deinstitutionalization un-
folds too quickly, then the burden tend to shift to other
human and human service sectors. Health and human
service system simply were not ready to deal with
servicer users who have heightened stress as a result of
living in the community, let alone assist with their re-
covery process [98]. The lack of synchronicity between
institution- and community-based services ultimately
had collateral results of fragmentation of services, lack
of quality assurance over available services, financial
cutbacks, and workforce shortages [99].
Deinstitutionalization is a critical juncture from which
vectors of mental health reform emergei. Very few coun-
tries have achieved an optimal mix of mental health
services just described. As a corollary, there is no gold
standard for mental health system organization so that
the needs of all people with MNS disorders are fulfilled.
The trajectories of mental health care (re)organization
offer researchers like us a provocative basis of compari-
son with respect to historical points of convergence or
divergence for countries [48,100,101].
Developed and developing countries face different chal-
lenges when it comes to mental health system deve-
lopment. The population in developing countries make up
84% of the world’s population, and yet developing coun-
tries claim only 11% of the world’s net health spending
[102]. Developing countries grapple with an under-provision of resources, personnel and services. Non-state
actors working in them advocate for increased investment
in those requiring mental health care. Governments of de-
veloping countries would counter these protests by saying
that they are hard pressed to invest in trial-and-error ex-
periments and search for the optimal mental health policy
framework and implementation plan suitable for their
population, especially under severe resource constraints.
The situation is different for developed countries where
the process of deinstitutionalization has led to closures of
mental hospitals and asylums, as well as a reduction in the
number of patients in the ones left standing. However, the
development of community-based residential and occupa-
tional facilities and the uptake of incident clinical cases
have not been commensurate with the pace of downsizing
or closing psychiatric institutions [103]. Both developing
and developed countries face problems such as parity in
the provision of resources between physical and mental
health services, the need to promote detection and treat-
ment of mental disorders in primary care settings, and
competing demands of psychiatric and other specialty
services.
Since the deinstitutionalization movement among de-
veloped countries generally preceded the one among
developing countries, the latter stands to gleam lessons
from the former in three main respects: release of indi-
viduals from hospitals into the community; diversion
from hospital admissions; and development of alterna-
tive community services [104]. This study addresses the
second respect. We look specifically at changes in in-
patient psychiatric bed rates among 193 countries over
the course of a decade. Results of this study have impli-
cations for striking the proper mix of mental health ser-
vice organizations and identifying the scope conditions
under which deinstitutionalization happens.
Data
The primary data source is the WHO Mental Health
Atlas (“Atlas”). Atlas serves as a map of mental health
infrastructure and resources in the world. A focal point
for mental health in the Ministry of Health was respon-
sible for completing the Atlas survey on behalf of his/
her WHO member state, associate or area. In some in-
stances the WHO regional offices assisted in collecting
the data. Three waves of Atlas data are available: 2001
(n = 184), 2005 (n = 193), and 2011 (n = 184) [105-107].
Dependent variable
The dependent variable should describe the physical
capital of national mental health systems since we are
interested in deinstitutionalization’s adoption to local
contexts. The density of psychiatric beds, as enumerated
from various biomedical settings, per country, and
across time was selected as a fitting indicator for this
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most expensive components of mental health systems,
accounting for up to three quarters of some national
mental health budgets [108]. The questions of how many
psychiatric beds are needed, how much they cost, and
whether existing psychiatric beds are well managed and
clinically appropriate continue to be heavily debated
[109-115]k. With that said, there are four potential indi-
cators from Atlas related to beds: total number of psy-
chiatric beds in the country; total number of beds in
mental hospitals; total number of beds in general hos-
pitals; and total number of beds in other settings. We
struck the last candidate indicator from consideration
because it was worded as “beds in other settings” for the
2001 and 2005 waves and as “beds in community resi-
dential facilities” in the 2011 wave. This inconsistency
was confirmed through Spearman’s correlation com-
paring the pairs of cross-sectional data, which was
high between 2001 and 2005 (rho = 0.96; p = 0.000),
but low between 2001 with 2011 (rho = 0.42; p = 0.005)
and between 2005 and 2011 (rho = 0.50; p = 0.001). This
led us to question the consistency of rates of total beds
across the three waves as well, but we found high Spearman
correlations for the other three indicators. We proceeded
with the analyses looking at population-scaled rates of
total beds, general hospital beds, and mental hospital beds
as outcomes of interest. We further transformed the three
types of bed rates per 100,000 population into logarithms
to control for outliers.
Independent variables
The independent variable is the timing of deinsti-
tutionalization adoption. The wording of the questions
on national mental health policy was inconsistent across
the three cross-sectional waves of Atlas: while the 2001
and 2005 waves asked about the existence of a national
mental health policy and, if yes, the year of its initial formu-
lation, the 2011 wave asked about the existence of an offi-
cially approved mental health policy and, if yes, the name
of the document and the year of its last revision. To estab-
lish the earliest mental health policy adoption in each coun-
try, we cross-walked the Atlas data with data from two
other datasets -the World Health Organization Assessment
Instrument for Mental Health Systems (WHO-AIMS) and
WHO MiNDbank- to verify whether and when each coun-
try had actually adopted itl. WHO-AIMS is a tool used to
collect essential information on the mental health system
of 42 low- and middle-income countries in 2005 [116,117].
And WHO MiNDbank is an online platform for the
sharing of information related to disability, human rights,
mental health, health and development [118].
Deinstitutionalization is one specific component of
national mental health policy [119]. Even though the
first two waves of Atlas assessed the existence of fivecomponents in the national mental health policy, none
were explicitly worded as deinstitutionalizationm. In the
absence of information about the attributes of mental
health policies, the year of initial adoption of national
mental health policy was taken as the main predictive
indicator. There are three potential ways to treat the
year of initial adoption of national mental health policy
as an independent variable: nominal, ordinal, and con-
tinuous. The nominal variable is simply adopter versus
non-adopter of any mental health policy. The ordinal
variable indicates the five phases of adoption: innovators
(2.5%; 1950–1959); early adopters (13.5%; 1960–1985);
early majority (34%; 1986–1998); late majority (34%;
1999–2011); resisters or non-adopters (16%). Rogers [12]
originally specified these cut-offs under a normal curve,
which continues to be commonly used in policy diffu-
sion research. Non-adopters and late majority make up
the referent category of the nominal and ordinal vari-
able, respectively. The year of mental health policy adop-
tion was also treated as a continuous variable, which was
zeroed on the year before the first historic adoption in
the WHO. We specified models using one of the three
functional forms as a robustness check of the assump-
tion of a linear relationship between mental health policy
adoption and bed rate change. The independent and
control variables were all lagged by one year. This way,
the risk of adoption in each year depends on the charac-
teristics of the sampled countries in the prior calendar
year. The lag effects are intended to address simultaneity
bias; otherwise, if lag effects are not used, regression co-
efficients will be overestimated and the standard errors
will be underestimated.
Control variables
Mental health system characteristics
Control variables are characteristics that could moderate
the relationship between mental health policy adoption
and implementation. We included a number of mental
health system and country characteristics as control va-
riables in our analysis for this reason. Mental health pol-
icy has greater effectiveness when it is accompanied by a
mental health plan or law since they help translate the
vision, values and principles articulated in policy into
concrete strategies and activities [120,121]n. The year of
initial formulation of national mental health plan and
law were thus controlled for in our analysis.
Formal and informal human resources are the front
line workers who deliver mental health services. The
mental health workforce is a channel that facilitates the
exchange of ideas and knowledge across geopolitical bor-
ders [44,76]. Ruef and Scott [122] have delineated this
so-called “normative isomorphic” force into managerial
legitimacy (e.g. efficiency, cost-containment) and technical
legitimacy (e.g. patient care quality, specialty training).
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their ability to develop and translate rationalized and uni-
versalistic knowledge ([123,124]: 24). Professional asso-
ciations, such as the World Psychiatric Association, hold
conferences and issue guidelines and newsletters to up-
hold clinical standards. Health care professionals are also
in the position to provide expert advice and recommenda-
tions to administrators and policymakers, so their stance
on deinstitutionalization can either spur or thwart the
movement on a national or global level. Taken together,
mental health professional presence is operationalized as
the logged rates of psychiatrists, nurses, psychologists, and
social workers per 100,000 population in our analysis.
The notion of recovery has permeated advocacy efforts
to promote mental health care in the community. Recovery
neatly couples with deinstitutionalization in that it entails
non-coercive therapeutic alliances between professional
and service users, autonomy among service users, and
empowerment on the part of users and their families
[125-127]. Civil society advocates for selected policy ideas,
inculcate awareness of deinstitutionalization to the public,
and generally promote certain policy cues [128]. Inter-
national NGOs (INGOs), such as the World Network of
Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, World Federation of
Mental Health, and MindFreedom International, and local
NGOs, such as Basic Needs in the UK, Mental Disability
Advocacy Centre in Budapest, and Disability Rights Inter-
national in the US, are champions of recovery and other
missing or neglected elements in existing mental health
policies [129,130]. INGOs maintain contact networks
through which ideas and discourses are spread across geo-
political borders [131-134]. Together with local NGO’s,
they demand corrective actions from governments and
mental health professionals. Local user and family asso-
ciations are also well positioned to advocate for families as
primary caretakers of patients. The organizational struc-
ture of voluntary associations mentioned are more nimble
and adaptive than government agencies and professional
associations, so they are predisposed to reacting quickly to
environmental exigencies. We thus operationalized in-
terest group presence as two dichotomous variables: the
existence of at least one user or family association and
NGOs’ involvement in mental health the same country.
Deinstitutionalization efforts would ideally be tailored to
the availability of financial resources [135,136]. A policy
innovation could either stimulate huge appropriations or
have little monetary impact, depending on the fiscal con-
ditions under which its adoption occurred [31]. If slack re-
sources are available, then decision makers can afford the
luxury to experiment and to accept the risk of potential
failure [61]. Investment is an explicit, observable, and
irrevocable proxy of a focal government’s commitment
to a mental health policy innovation [137,138]o. Dedi-
cated and ongoing funding to implement and routinizedeinstitutionalization is thus operationalized as the total
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP, which
varies by country-year. We collected these figures from
the WHO National Health Account and the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators databases.
Five other features of mental health systems were
taken into account. The magnitude of the mental health
policy problem is captured by annual prevalence rates of
MNS disorders on the country level, with international
epidemiological data for all three waves provided by the
Global Burden of Disease Study [139-143]p. Specifically,
the logged rate of disability adjusted life-years due to
MNS disorder per 100,000 population was included in
our analysis. Information on the scale of MNS disorders
could help determine resource allocation and develop-
ment priorities by ministries of health and finance [144].
The usage of an information system to keep track of the
transition from institution- to community-based care
was therefore controlled for in our analyses. The caveat
here is that application of the same data in monitoring
and evaluating mental health systems was not assessed
in Atlas.
Mental health problems often co-occur with acute and
chronic physical health problems. Furthermore, access
to mental health specialists is challenging even though
effective treatment exists for the most common mental
health problems and their comorbid conditions. The
integration of mental health care into primary care and
community-based settings is beneficial in addressing
these problems. They improve access to mental health
care, provide care for comorbid physical health problems
in order improve health outcomes holistically, avoid of
fragmentation of health services; reduce social stigma,
and optimize the small number of psychiatric specialists
[145-149]. A viable, pragmatic way to integrate mental
health into primary health care or community-settings is
task-shifting, or having specialists transfer some of their
clinical skills to non-specialists typically through class-
room training, followed by clinical supervision. Such
integration programs would ideally be in place in order
for individuals with common mental health problems to
thrive in the community. To determine if clinical consul-
tations have been held outside of psychiatric institutions,
we controlled for the integration of mental health into
general health care and the existence of a system of
community-based care.
A segment of that same population requires integrated
therapy consisting of psychosocial and pharmacological
interventions. The discovery of antipsychotic medication
has been credited to complement the development of
community-based psychosocial treatment and rehabi-
litation [82,150]. And antidepressant and antipsychotic
drugs are typically listed on national essential drug lists.
Therefore, we controlled for national expenditure on this
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diture on health, in our analysis.
Country characteristics
Certain country-level factors can also enable or inhibit
mental health policy implementation. We included six
factors that are motivated by prior literature. Govern-
ments face difficult choices in prioritizing mental health
over other issues, especially in the midst of a global eco-
nomic downturn. In addition to health expenditure as a
percentage of GDP, we used the sampled countries’
income category to see if it affects psychiatric bed rates.
The World Bank classifies countries according to 2012
GNI per capita in US dollars using the World Bank Atlas
method, thus yielding low, lower middle, upper middle,
and high income economies [151]. These four groups
were included in our analysis as an ordinal variable.
Disasters, devastating in and of themselves, present an
opportunity for radical innovation within the mental
health system. Natural and technological disasters disrupt
the order of a country’s health system, and could poten-
tially spur changes in the quantity of beds during the re-
building efforts. We controlled for the annual count of the
disasters, which was furnished by the International Disas-
ter Database [152]. Man-made disasters are anticipated
shocks to countries engaged in them. During times of war,
governments are more likely to allocate resources on na-
tional defense rather than on other policy agenda items.
For this reason, we used data on the number of historical
intra-, inter-, and extra-state wars from the Correlates of
War Project [153,154]. A dichotomous variable for any
engagement in war and a count variable of the number of
wars in a given year were included in our analysis. The re-
sults would shed light on whether deinstitutionalization is
part of the transition governments made so that the emer-
gency state would be on a more sustainable footing.
Mental health policy formulation and implementation
are directly tied to government effectiveness, so we in-
cluded a measure from the World Bank’s Governance
Matters Project. Governments that are coopted by elite
groups in society are less likely to enforce policies bene-
fitting the disenfranchised, namely those with MNS
disorders. We statistically controlled for the potential
negative effects of ethnic, linguistics, and religious clea-
vages on mental health policy implementation using
Fractionalization Data [155]. This summary score and its
three components -ethnic, linguistic, language- were
separately controlled for in our analysis. And finally,
governments prioritize the needs, rights, and interests of
people with MNS disorders to varying degrees. To test
this claim, we included the proxy of Physical Integrity
Right Index from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights
Dataset in our models [156,157]. Political imprisonment, a
dimension of physical integrity, was tested separately inour analysis because psychiatric institutionalization has
been used as an instrument of political control and social
oppression.
Selected covariates were log transformed and centered
to avoid potential collinearity problems where we observed
outliers from their scatter plots against the dependent vari-
able. For variables with multiple indicators, we performed
sensitivity analyses to explore the degree of correlation be-
tween indicators as initial evidence of reliability. We also
fitted separate models for candidate indicators. All control
variables described are summarized in Additional file 1.
Statistical model
The analysis entails running random effects (RE) linear
models according to the following prediction equation:
Y it ¼ a0þ β1x1þ εit þ μt
where Yit represents the logged rate of psychiatric beds,
β’s are the matrices of parameter estimates, i represents
country and t is the year of observation subscript, and εit
and μt are the respective between- and within-period
error terms. Regional-level factors cause errors to be
correlated across observations, or intra-cluster corre-
lation, so we chose RE modeling as an estimation ap-
proach to produce efficient estimates. In RE models, the
variation across countries, or psu’s, is assumed to be
random and uncorrelated with the main predictor or
the other independent variables included in the model.
The assumption behind RE is that the error term is not
correlated with predictor variables, thus allowing time-
invariant, country-specific characteristics to be expla-
natory variables. In other words, the RE model assumes
that the intercepts differ for each country, or corr
(μt, MHPolit) = 0.
We compared RE models to log linear and fixed effects
(FE) linear models for sensitivity analysis. RE models were
compared to log linear models using the Breusch-Pagan
(B-P) Lagrange multiplier test. If the B-P null hypothesis
is rejected, then RE is preferred. If we fail to reject the B-P
null hypothesis, then log linear is appropriate because no
clustering is observed across the three waves. FE modeling
was used as the alternative estimation approach to address
potential omitted variable bias problems with RE models,
which cause the error terms to be correlated with the in-
dependent variables. FE models remove the effect of these
omitted, time-invariant characteristics from the predictor
variables so the predictors’ effect could be better assessed.
Like RE, the FE model accounted for clustering in the data
by estimating a separate intercept for each wave while the
log linear regression model estimated a common intercept
for all countries in the sample. We used the Hausman test
to compare the RE and FE models. If the Hausman null
hypothesis is rejected then we will use the FE model
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the Hausman null then the RE model is retained because
it is more efficient.
The three sets of aforementioned models were pro-
duced with only the independent variable (e.g. MHPolit).
We then repeated the procedure for the multivariate
analysis with independent and control variables. Log lin-
ear models were also produced for each wave, and
goodness-of-fit chi-square test was used to see how well
each model fit the data. The FE and RE models included
wave-specific intercepts, and the robust option was used
to correct for heteroskedasticity. Stata version 12 was
used for all analyses.
Results
Atlas indicates that 148 countries adopted mental health
policy and 45 did not from 1950 to 2011. Figure 1 is a
map showing countries in various stages of mental health
policy adoption. Descriptive statistics and correlation
matrices for mental hospital beds, general hospital beds,
and all psychiatric beds are respectively presented in
Tables 1, 2, and 3. Univariate regression results for the
main independent variable are reported in Table 4. To as-
sess the relationship between phase of mental health pol-
icy adoption and bed rates we had initially divided the
ordinal variable into five categories: innovators, early
adopters, early majority, late majority, and resisters. Re-
sults of Table 4 show that between phase effects were
almost entirely driven by the innovators, pointing to a
stark difference between innovators and other adoption
groups in mental health system reform. Robustness
checks, not shown but available upon request by the
authors, further show that between phase effects were nul-
lified once we combined innovators and early adopters
into a single category and compared them to late-adoptersFigure 1 Phases of mental health policy adoption.(referent category). We ultimately retained the ‘innovators’
category, collapsed the three later adopting groups (early
adopter, early majority, late majority) into a ‘late adopters’
category, and renamed resisters as ‘non-adopters’ for sub-
sequent analyses because innovators have played a unique
role in mental health policy diffusion [3,12,39]. Regression
results for the final linear random effects models are re-
ported in Table 5. Models 1, 3, and 5 (“baseline models”)
include only control variables, while models 2, 4, and 6
(“multivariate models”) contain independent and control
variables for mental hospital bed rates, general hospital
bed rates, and overall bed rates, respectively.
The results indicate support for our question that
stresses a difference in bed rates by mental health policy
adoption phase. Hypothesis 1 posited that late adopters of
mental health policy are more likely than early adopters to
reduce the number of psychiatric beds in their country.
The mental hospital bed rates (model 2) and overall bed
rates (model 6), shown in Table 5, confirm this hypothesis.
We find no evidence in support of the corollary, or hy-
pothesis 2, that late adopters of mental health policy have
a lower likelihood of reducing the number of psychiatric
beds than early adopters. In model 6, the expected rate of
all psychiatric beds per 100,000 persons is 197% higher for
innovators than late adopters, all else being equal. More-
over, in model 2 the expected rate for mental hospital beds
per 100,000 persons also increased by a dramatic 241% for
innovators as compared to late adopters, with all else
being equal. These expected differences suggest late
adopters are more likely to decrease the overall rate of psy-
chiatric beds, and specifically mental hospital beds, than
early adoptersq. This was not the case for general hospital
beds (model 4). Compared to late adopters, non-adopters
have a pronounced 248% increase in the expected rate of
general hospital beds per 100,000 population, as per
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation matrix of all psychiatric beds
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Log of all
psychiatric beds
2.76 1.71 -4.05 5.76
2. Mental health
policy
1.58 1.51 0 4 -0.01
3. Mental health
plan
2.78 1.35 0 4 -0.06 -0.45*
4. Mental health
law
2.48 1.47 0 4 0.45* -0.17 0.03
5. Log of
psychiatrists
0.01 2.12 -6.21 3.72 0.83* 0.02 -0.05 0.45*
6. Log of nurses 1.05 2.32 -6.91 6.81 0.79* -0.04 -0.02 0.41* 0.77*
7. Log of
psychologist
-0.32 2.4 -6.21 4.66 0.65* 0.00 0.01 0.30* 0.77* 0.63*
8. Log of social
workers
-0.55 2.47 -6.61 6.17 0.64* 0.06 -0.02 0.28* 0.71* 0.63* 0.80*
9. Mental-primary
care
0.93 0.26 0 1 0.29* -0.12* 0.03 0.12* 0.20* 0.23* 0.16* 0.05
10. Community care 0.76 0.42 0 1 0.25* 0.03 -0.05 0.15* 0.24* 0.30* 0.18* 0.19 0.32
11. User & family
assocs.
0.79 0.41 0 1 0.15* -0.08 -0.08* 0.24* 0.20* 0.08 0.18* 0.10* 0.11* 0.08
12. NGO’s 0.88 0.32 0 1 0.06 -0.10* 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.13* -0.04 0.13* 0.24* 0.24*
13. Health info.tech. 1.22 0.47 0 2 -0.16* 0.03 -0.04 -0.10* -0.17* -0.22* -0.04 -0.04 -0.19* -0.33* -0.01 -0.03
14. Log of MNS
disorders
8.03 0.37 5.31 8.68 0.29* -0.06 -0.07 0.17* 0.33* 0.31* 0.26* 0.13* 0.13* 0.30* 0.01 -0.01 -0.31*
15. Pharmaceutical;
Health spending
23.12 10.44 6 70.5 -0.30* 0.15* 0.00 -0.21* -0.34* -0.30* -0.32* -0.09* -0.18* -0.09* -0.04 -0.07 -0.13*
16. Health spending
(%GDP)
6.42 2.75 0.5 21.89 0.26* -0.01 0.08 0.24* 0.34* 0.28 0.45* 0.32* 0.12* 0.12* 0.21* 0.11* -0.13* 0.22* -0.20*
17. World Bank
income group
2.35 1.11 1 4 0.69* 0.10* -0.05 0.29* 0.77* 0.67* 0.73* 0.71* 0.18* 0.35* 0.13* 0.08 -0.19* 0.32* -0.34* 0.24*
18. Log of disasters 1.13 0.96 0 4.56 -0.26* -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.17* -0.117* -0.13* 0.01 -0.02 0.17* 0.15* 0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.01* -0.12*
19. Instances of war 0.12 0.33 0 1 -0.24* -0.08 0.09 0.03 -0.11* -0.09 -0.08 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.14* -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.30*
20. Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
1.24 0.60 0.01 2.52 -0.33* -0.04 0.03 -0.17* -0.48* -0.29* -0.43* -0.33* -0.11* -0.12* -0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.20* 0.06 -0.17 -0.35* 0.07 0.15*
21. Political
imprisonment
1.22 0.83 0 2 0.35* 0.06 -0.02 0.15* 0.36* 0.36* 0.46* 0.34* 0.02 0.12* 0.05 0.14* -0.06 0.14* -0.15* 0.31* 0.39* -0.29* -0.11* -0.14*
22. Government
effectiveness























Table 2 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation matrix of psychiatric beds in mental hospitals
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Log of all mental
hospital beds
2.54 1.7 -3.51 5.44
2. Mental health policy 1.58 1.51 0 4 -0.04
3. Mental health plan 2.78 1.35 0 4 -0.10* -0.45*
4. Mental health law 2.48 1.47 0 4 0.42* -0.17* 0.03
5. Log of psychiatrists 0.01 2.12 -6.21 3.72 0.79* 0.02 -0.05 0.45*
6. Log of nurses 1.05 2.32 -6.91 6.81 0.76* -0.04 -0.02 0.41* 0.77*
7. Log of psychologists -0.32 2.4 -6.21 4.66 0.61* 0.00 0.01 0.3* 0.77* 0.63*
8. Log of social workers -0.55 2.47 -6.91 6.17 0.62* 0.06 -0.02 0.28 0.71* 0.62* 0.80
9. Mental-primary care 0.93 0.26 0 1 0.22* -0.12* 0.03 0.12* 0.20* 0.23* 0.16* 0.05*
10. Community care 0.76 0.42 0 1 0.22* 0.03 -0.05 0.15* 0.24* 0.30* 0.18* 0.19 0.32*
11. User & family assocs. 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.001 -0.08 0.16* 0.24* 0.20* 0.08 0.18* 0.10 0.11* 0.08
12. NGO’s 0.88 0.32 0 1 0.04 -0.10* 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.13* -0.02 -0.04 0.13* 0.24* 0.24*
13. Health info. tech. 1.12 0.47 0 2 -0.13* 0.03 -0.04 -0.1* -0.7* -0.22* -0.04 -0.04 -0.19* -0.33* -0.01 -0.03
14. Log of MNS
disorders
8.03 0.37 5.31 8.68 0.26* -0.06 -0.07 0.17* 0.33* 0.31* 0.26* 0.13* 0.13* 0.30* 0.01 -0.01 -0.31*
15. Pharmaceutical: Health spending 23.12 10.44 6 70.5 -0.26* 0.15* 0.00 -0.21* -0.34* -0.32* -0.32* -0.32* -0.09* -018* -0.09* -0.04 0.07 -0.13*
16. Health spending
(%GDP)
6.42 2.75 0.5 21.89 0.26* -0.01 0.08 0.24* 0.34* 0.28* 0.45* 0.32* 0.12* 0.12* 0.21* 0.11* -0.13* 0.22* -0.20*
17. World Bank income
group
2.35 1.11 1 4 0.63* 0.10* -0.05 0.29* 0.77* 0.67* 0.73* 0.71* 0.18* 0.35* 0.13* 0.08 -0.19* 0.32* -0.34* 0.24*
18. Log of disasters 1.13 0.96 0 4.56 -0.26* -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.17* -0.17* -0.13* 0.01 -0.02 0.17* 0.15* 0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.1* -0.12*
19. Instances of war 0.12 0.33 0 1 -0.24* -0.08 0.09 0.03 -0.11* -0.09 -0.08 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.14* -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.30*
20. Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
1.24 0.6 0.01 2.52 -0.33* -0.04 0.03 -0.17* -0.48* -0.29* -0.43* -0.33* -0.11* -0.12* -0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.20* 0.06 -0.17* -0.35* 0.07 0.15*
21. Political
imprisonment
1.22 0.83 0 2 0.35* 0.06 -0.02 0.15* 0.36* 0.36* 0.46* 0.34* 0.02 0.12* 0.05 0.14* -0.06 0.14* -0.15* 0.31* 0.39* -0.29* -0.11* -0.14*
22. Government
effectiveness























Table 3 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation matrix of psychiatric beds in general hospitals
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Log of all
general hospital
beds
0.98 1.84 -4.96 5.25
2. Mental health
policy
1.58 1.51 0 4 0.14*
3. Mental health
plan
2.78 1.35 0 4 -0.17* -0.45*
4. Mental health
law
2.48 1.47 0 4 0.35* -0.17 0.03
5. Log of
psychiatrists
0.01 2.12 -6.21 3.72 0.71* 0.02 -0.05 0.45*
6. Log of nurses 1.05 2.32 -6.91 6.81 0.63* -0.04 -0.02 0.41* 0.77*
7. Log of
psychologists
-0.32 2.4 -6.21 4.66 0.66* 0.00 0.01 0.30* 0.77* 0.63*
8. Log of social
workers
-0.55 2.47 -6.91 6.17 0.60* 0.06 -0.02 0.28* 0.71* 0.62* 0.80*
9. Mental-primary
care
0.93 0.26 0 1 0.15* -0.12* 0.03 0.12* 0.2* 0.23* 0.16* 0.05
10. Community
care
0.76 0.42 0 1 0.19* 0.03 -0.05 0.15* 0.24* 0.3* 0.18* 0.19* 0.32*
11. User & family
assocs.
0.79 0.41 0 1 0.13* -0.08 0.16* 0.24* 0.20* 0.08* 0.18* 0.10 0.11* 0.08
12. NGO’s 0.88 0.32 0 1 0.00 -0.10* 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.13* -0.02 -0.04 0.13* 0.24* 0.24*
13. Health in.tech 1.12 0.47 0 2 -0.16* 0.03 -0.04 -0.10* -0.17* -0.22* -0.04 -0.04 -0.19* -0.33* -0.01 -0.03
14. Log of MNS
disorders
8.03 0.37 5.31 8.68 0.23* -0.06 -0.07 0.17* 0.33* 0.26* 0.13* 0.13* 0.30* 0.01 -0.01 -0.31*
15. Pharmaceutical;;
Health spending
23.12 10.44 6 70.5 -0.36* 0.15* 0.00 -0.21* -0.34* -0.32* -0.32* -0.09* -0.18* -0.09* -0.04 0.07 -0.13*
16. Health
spending (% GDP)
6.42 2.75 0.5 21.89 0.41* -0.01 0.08 0.24* 0.34* 0.28* 0.45* 0.32* 0.12* 0.12* 0.21* -0.11* -0.13* 0.22* -0.20*
17. World Bank
income group
2.35 1.11 1 4 0.64* 0.10* -0.05 0.29* 0.77* 0.67* 0.73* 0.71* 0.18* 0.35* 0.13* 0.08* -0.19* 0.32* -0.34* 0.24*
18. Log of disasters 1.13 0.96 0 4.56 -0.18* -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.17* -0.17* -0.13* 0.01 -0.02 0.17* 0.15* 0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.10 -0.12*
19. Instances of war 0.12 0.33 0 1 -0.12 -0.08 0.09 0.03 -0.11* -0.09 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.14* -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.30*
20. Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
1.24 0.6 0.01 2.52 -0.34* -0.04 0.03 -0.17* -0.48* -0.29* -0.43* -0.33* -0.11* -0.2* -0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.20* 0.06 -0.17* -0.35* 0.07 0.15
21. Political
imprisonment
1.22 0.83 0 2 0.46* 0.06 -0.02 0.15* 0.36* 0.36* 0.46* 0.34* 0.02 0.12* 0.05 0.14* -0.06 0.14* -0.15* 0.31* 0.39* -0.29* -0.11* 0.14
22. Government
effectiveness























Table 4 Univariate linear random effects models predicting psychiatric bed ratesa
Psychiatric beds in mental hospitals Psychiatric beds in general hospitals Psychiatric beds in all settings
Innovators 1.60*** 1.39 1.83***
(0.39) (0.82) (0.42)
Early adopters -0.24 0.21 0.04
(0.38) (0.43) (0.38)
Early majority -0.13 0.13 0.29
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32)
Non-adopters -0.48 0.63 -0.09
(0.45) (0.44) (0.38)
Constant 2.60*** 0.71** 2.62***
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25)
Number of observations 430 408 457
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
aRobust standard errors are in parentheses. Late majority is the reference group for the mental health policy adoption variable.
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adopters are more likely than non-adopters to cut down
on the number of beds in general hospitals.
Results for the mental health system and country demo-
graphic variables offer limited support for a model empha-
sizing change in psychiatric bed rates. The findings
indicate that a mental health law makes countries signifi-
cantly more likely to decrease the rate of all psychiatric
beds. This confirms previous findings that the passage of
psychiatric legislation augmented augmented deinstitu-
tionalization in countries such as Australia [158], United
Kingdom [159], Italy [160], and United States [161]. The
mental health workforce seemed to be a countervailing
force to deinstitutionalization in that the rate of psychia-
trists or nurses is directly proportional to the rates of
mental hospital, general hospital, and overall psychiatric
bed rates, holding all other explanatory variables constant.
For every 10% increase in the rate of psychiatrists per
100,000 population, there is an expected increase of 2.24%
to 2.56% in rate of psychiatric bed per 100,000 population,
depending on the model. Likewise, the rate of psychi-
atric bed per 100,000 population is expected to increase
anywhere from 2.25% to 2.56%, depending on the
model, when the rate of nurses per 100,000 population
increases by 10%. These independent main effects cor-
respond to a related, long-standing clash between pro-
ponents of institutional psychiatry and advocates of
mental patients’ rights [162,163]. Psychiatric institu-
tions may be significant contributors to the local econ-
omies of isolated communities, as is the case in former
Soviet Republics, which means closing or downsizing
them would dim the employment prospects of staff and
instigate other negative consequences on the local econ-
omy [88,164]. Deinstitutionalization poses as a radical
challenge to the basic tenets of medicine and traditional
configurations of biomedical institutions, so it is notsurprising that some of its fiercest opponents are psy-
chiatrists and nurses.
And finally, the pattern of statistical significance seemed
to be especially acute when there are exogenous shocks to
the mental health system in the form of war, natural disas-
ters, and infringement of human rights. Oftentimes, mental
health comes to the attention of local policymakers after a
terrible global tragedy, such as the Asian Tsunami or war
in Afghanistan. For every occurrence of natural disaster
historically, there is an expected decrease of 1% in rate of
mental hospital (model 2) or overall (model 6) psychiatric
beds per 100,000 population. Disasters bring to the fore a
combination of challenges -some unique to the health
sector- that contribute to inequities in accessing mental
health care: stigmatization, lack of empowerment within a
highly vulnerable population, abuse of human rights and
reluctance to change historical allocations of resources
[165]. The relationship is the opposite for wars: general
hospital beds per 100,000 persons is expected to increase
by 57% (model 4) and overall hospital beds per 100,000
persons by 36% (model 6) for every instance of war. None-
theless, wars help cast a spotlight on deinstitutionalization-
related challenges and the opportunities to alleviate mental
health problems. It is promising to find that humanitarian
and emergency relief have left an imprint on affected coun-
tries such that governments have been compelled to
strengthen health systems during their country’s recovery
period.
The extent to which deinstitutionalization efforts is tai-
lored to available national resources or population needs
is limited. The results for the control variables show no
support for the argument that population status (e.g.
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, burden of MNS disor-
ders), spending on health, or national income level chan-
ged psychiatric bed rates over the course of a decader. The
interaction of mental health spending and national income
Table 5 Multivariate linear random effects models predicting psychiatric bed ratesb
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Innovators 1.23* 0.51 1.09*
(0.37) (0.97) (0.25)
Non-adopters -0.09 1.25* -0.02
(0.41) (0.34) (0.30)
Mental health plan -0.02 0.00 -0.28* -0.16 -0.07 -0.05
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08)
Mental health law 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20* 0.20*
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)
Log of psychiatrists 0.27* 0.26* 0.23+ 0.23+ 0.25* 0.25*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)
Log of nurses 0.27* 0.26* 0.21* 0.23* 0.25* 0.25*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Log of psychologists -0.03 -0.02 0.16 0.15 -0.08 -0.07
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07)
Log of social workers 0.02 0.01 -0.15 -0.14 0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06)
Mental-primary care 1.36+ 1.43+ -0.60 -0.63 0.61 0.67
(0.76) (0.76) (0.99) (0.96) (0.42) (0.42)
Community care -0.05 -0.06 -0.20 -0.18 0.06 0.04
(0.15) (0.16) (0.26) (0.26) (0.13) (0.13)
User and family assocs -0.40 -0.48 -0.41 -0.32 -0.41 -0.47
(0.35) (0.37) (0.42) (0.39) (0.31) (0.32)
NGO’s -0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.87 0.17 0.18
(0.42) (0.53) (0.78) (0.66) (0.44) (0.50)
Health info. tech. 0.16+ 0.18+ -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07)
Log of MNS disorders 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07)
Pharmaceutical:Health spending -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.02) (0.10) (0.01)
Health spending (%GDP) -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
World Bank income group 0.19 0.18 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.05
(0.12) (0.11) (0.02) (0.17) (0.01) (0.10)
Log of disasters -0.09+ -0.09+ -0.05 -0.02 -0.10* -0.10*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Instances of war 0.18 0.18 0.45* 0.45* 0.31* 0.31*
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.25 -0.27 0.07 0.03 -0.25 -0.27
(0.22) (0.21) (0.26) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18)
Political imprisonment 0.12+ 0.12+ 0.13 0.11 0.10* 0.10+
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Government effectiveness -0.02 -0.08 0.45+ 0.34 0.10 0.05
(0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
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Table 5 Multivariate linear random effects models predicting psychiatric bed ratesb (Continued)
Constant 0.52 0.58 1.61 0.11 1.93+ 1.94
(1.37) (1.53) (1.91) (1.80) (1.09) (1.22)
Number of observations 117 117 118 118 131 131
Breusch-Pagan chibar2(01) 20.08* 25.34* 25.71*
0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman chi2(13) 8.75* 14.27* 4.36*
0.00 0.00 0.00
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05.
bModels 1 and 2 pertain to mental hospital beds, 3 and 4 to general hospital beds, and 5 and 6 to overall bed rates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
‘Late adopters’ is the reference category against which innovators and non-adopters were compared to. It is a combination of early adopters, early majority, and
late majority in Table 4.
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dicators. Even where there is a political responsiveness to
the burden of mental illness, the level of available re-
sources earmarked to address it would depend on the
state of the economy. So, even if a considerable percentage
of the total health budget is allocated to mental health,
this would not amount to much in terms of net resources
if the level of national income is low. Governments have
an imperative to keep public finance under control or to
make loan repayments, which means that mental health
services are particularly vulnerable when public services
have to be cut. Building a revenue collection and financing
system that relies less on out-of-pocket payments and
more on tax-funded mental health treatment or social in-
surance prepayment schemes is one way to advance the
deinstitutionalization movement [166].
Neither civil society (e.g. NGOs, user and family asso-
ciation) participation nor health information technology
is a significant predictor of logged bed rates. This is con-
trary to our prior expectations since civil society plays a
vital role in challenging the prudence of government ac-
tion, and they help compensate for areas where mental
health is given a low priority [167,168]. Also surprising
is the non-significance of health information technology.
Even if policymakers give greater priority to mental
health, a paucity of information and data infrastructure
are key constraints on the development of mental health
services and resource allocation. And lastly, we found no
evidence to support the arguments that government
effectiveness, community-based care, and mental health
care in primary settings affect psychiatric bed rates.
We conducted three additional analyses to check for
robustness of results presented in Table 5 using alternate
estimation methods. First, we estimated the three types
of logged bed rates using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Coefficient estimates for mental health policy adoption
had magnitude and direction consonant with those pro-
duced by OLS with RE, but the OLS set did not reach
significance. This is likely due to violation of key OLS
assumptions. The results of Breusch-Pagan test, foundon the bottom of Table 5, suggest that the OLS with RE is
more appropriate than OLS alone. Second, we analyzed
the same dataset using OLS with FE instead of RE. The
point estimates and standard errors of Table 5 held. We
suspect that country FE relevant to bed rate changes chan-
ged over a ten-year period. The Hausman test results, also
found on the bottom of Table 5, pointed to the selection
of RE models as the more conservative choice. In the third
robustness check, we estimated logged bed rate changes
with predictor variables lagged by one year. The coeffi-
cient estimates for the hypothesized effects followed the
same pattern of significance reported in Table 5, except
for changes in standard errors for the covariates. This sug-
gests little autocorrelation among the three waves of the
WHO Mental Health Atlas dataset.
Discussion
This study contributes to the empirical literature on global
health, neo-institutional theory, and governance. Deinsti-
tutionalization represents a neo-liberal mode of eman-
cipating people with MNS disorders from psychiatric
institutions, and supporting their livelihood in the com-
munity. The impetus is to move severely mentally ill
people out of psychiatric institutions and into the com-
munity, then closing down part or all of those institutions.
Today, more than a half century after the first country
ratified a mental health policy, neither the sentiment nor
the programmatic need for deinstitutionalization has
changed.
National governments reflect, enact, and propagate de-
institutionalization in varying degrees. Policies are not
only artifacts of nation-states’ sovereignty, but they are
also signs of support for internationally sanctioned ideolo-
gies. The act of adopting a policy allows countries to (re)
build their public image and, indirectly, maintain their
regional presence [163,169]. However, national govern-
ments may not be compelled to address the needs of
people with severe and chronic mental illness unless they
realize the epidemic has a direct impact on the economy
[136,170,171]. An example of the low policy priority that
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Development Report, which highlighted mental disorders
as a major contributor to the global burden of disease, but
failed to include anything in its recommendations that
would address mental health [172]. If programs associated
with deinstitutionalization are to be improved, the original
decisions behind enacting mental health policy must be
rigorously evaluateds. Our study is one of the first to test
whether the universal aspiration to deinstitutionalize
psychiatry has been attained using empirical data on na-
tional mental health systems. Having layered a temporal
dimension onto the spatial dimension of the phenomenon
of policy diffusion, we were able to observe whether gov-
ernments adopted or abandoned this particular core belief
animating mental health policies.
We compared 193 countries belonging to different
phases of mental health policy adoption on the extent to
which they comply with international norms surrounding
deinstitutionalization. The cornerstone of deinstitutio-
nalization is the reduction of inpatient, psychiatric beds.
We chose this particular indicator as the outcome of
interest because it is an explicit, rationalized, and differen-
tiated feature most commonly used to compare national
health systems. Regression modeling of standardized rates
of mental hospital, general hospital, and overall inpatient
psychiatric beds revealed dramatic variations among
countries in the timing and intensity of deinstitutio-
nalization. Early adopters offer prescriptive actions that
are substantiated by efficiency logics, scientific evidence
(e.g. epidemiology, cost-effective analysis), and technical
know-how that would not only facilitate policy diffusion,
but help decision makers in later adopting countries dis-
cern appropriate from inappropriate activities and goals.
Late adopters draw on earlier adopters’ experiences, and
acted quickly in downscaling psychiatric institutions.
Policy development and oversight are strongly linked in
this scenario. And we found evidence supporting claims
based on this scenario, in terms of an increase in logged
rates of psychiatric beds in mental hospitals and across all
biomedical institutions for innovators relative to late
adopters, after adjusting for characteristics of the mental
health system and the country. These results are not sur-
prising considering that deinstitutionalization has been
happening in innovator countries for the past half century,
and that their psychiatric bed rates have fluctuated since
inception. The results also correspond to the trans-
and re-institutionalization movements, discussed in the
Method section, where trends of increasing psychiatric
beds and mental health wards have been documented in
developed countries [95,111,113,173].
Governments are just as likely to gain acceptance for
unfamiliar practices, forms, and values associated with
deinstitutionalization under the logic of legitimacy. There
are outliers like Japan, which adopted a mental healthpolicy as early as 1950, but also has one of the highest ra-
tios of psychiatric beds per capita in the world [71,174].
Policy development and oversight are decoupled in this
scenario. We did not find evidence supporting this
diametrically opposing argument in rates of psychiatric
beds for non-adopters relative to innovators, holding other
control variables constant. The evidence suggests that late
adopters of mental health policy -ceteris paribus- are more
likely than innovators to reduce psychiatric beds, but this
input-output-outcome relationship merits further research
attentiont.
Our empirical results provided support for the indepen-
dent impact of mental health law, workforce, disasters, war,
and political imprisonment on changes in bed rates. Our
analysis, however, provided no support for the integration
of mental health in primary care and community-based
settings, civil society participation, health information tech-
nology usage, spending on health, national income level,
and population mental health and social status. The ab-
sence of supporting evidence on these variables invites
more research. Alternative indicators could be developed
and used in multi-level analysis to see if the results re-
ported in this article are affected by the state of knowledge
on these variables chosen or by measurement error in the
indicators themselves.
Our study is limited in three ways. First, this is a study
of contemporary mental health care. Our panel includes
only three waves of data spanning 2001 to 2011, which
prevented us from observing the dynamic process of
mental health policy implementation outside of the
study period. This limitation made it so that we could
only make coarse grain comparison of the implementa-
tion patterns among three phases in the mental health
policy diffusion cycle. It may be the case that certain fac-
tors operate well before or well beyond the horizon of
the study period. One plausible scenario is that the ‘least
disabled’ and ‘most independent’ patients are discharged
first to show encouraging signs of moving people from
hospital to community. This success would be harder to
replicate with patients with higher needs and severe and
chronic mental illness. As this closure process is under-
way, decision makers might be alarmed by the escalating
costs incurred from the hospitals and from care pro-
vided in the community. Governments that do not have
separate plans and funds would find it difficult to sustain
both institution- and community-based services during
the transition period of closing and downsizing psychi-
atric institutions. Deinstitutionalization could have not
happened at all, fallen short at the first stage of policy
adoption, reached maturity at the second stage of mental
health systems reorganization, or, equally plausible, took
longer than a decade to be actualized. Future research may
investigate the linearity of deinstitutionalization process in
different countries.
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analysis of different translations of mental health policy,
even if one was ratified. Every country has an amalgam of
mental health policy components and, moreover, psychia-
tric beds make up just one metric of accomplishing dein-
stitutionalizationu. Savvy policymakers may be tempted to
concentrate on changing only the areas of mental health
systems that can generate visible and immediate benefits
even if the need for them is low. It is easier and cheaper to
transform infrastructure rather than apply tacit knowledge
in other ways, and if this is the policymakers’ underlying
intent, then it would not be surprising to see more rapid
reduction in beds in late-adopting countries rather than in
innovator countriesv. Tacit knowledge takes longer to gain
traction, especially in countries with a decentralized gov-
ernment, because it is acquired mostly through learning
by doing [175]. Return on workforce development invest-
ments, for example, may take several years before per-
formance changes are observed. The (re)configuration of
existing services also does not necessarily mean that there
will be immediate improvements in clinical outcomes and
quality of life for patients. International organizations, civil
society, and others have advocated, and continue to advo-
cate, for a long-term commitment to service delivery from
governments.
Even though the crux of the philosophy of dein-
stitutionalization is about bridging the gap between
the closure and mental hospitals and building up of
community-based services, a second equally, if not more
important gap that deserves mention is one that exists be-
tween the epidemiological burden of MNS disorders and
the provision of psychiatric and mental health services
[176]. Documented rates of psychiatric beds found in gen-
eral hospitals are the closest proxy of community-based
services in this study. The utilization of psychiatric beds in
general hospitals has the added benefits of reducing
stigma of mental disorders, facilitating public access, mini-
mizing violations of human rights, and bringing greater
attention to the diagnosis and treatment of comorbid con-
ditions [85,109,177,178]. Nonetheless, the extent to which
psychiatric deinstitutionalization is embedded in cognitive
and cultural frames, rules, and routines of community-
based institutions remains to be measured.
Deinstitutionalization may denote reduced bed capacity,
but not reduced patient demand for treatment. Aside from
measuring the shift away from dependence on psychiatric
institutions, the methods of this study can be replicated
for changes observed in services offered by psychiatric de-
partments in general hospitals, clinics, nursing homes,
and private practitioners. It can also be replicated for pa-
rameters of mental health service utilization, such as ad-
mission, bed occupancy, readmission and relapse, default,
outpatient attendance rates, and average length of stay.
Deinstitutionalized mental health care also entails growingcommunity-based services, which can be measured via the
density of supportive housing, satisfaction of family care-
takers, and prison populations. The extent of decoupling
in different loci of health and human services prompts
future studies to look at the concordance between
development of community services and reduction in
institution-based services.
Finally, the implementation of mental health policy de-
pends on many country- and health system-level factors,
which undoubtedly play a role in national government’s
decision to have adopted it in the first place [179]. Our
results indicated that bed rates changed in contingent
ways, yet the control variables we used are insufficient in
explaining the inter- and intra-country variance. These
findings provide impetus for future study on the insti-
tutionalization of deinstitutionalizing mental health care
as a process shaped by characteristics of the countries,
as well as one determined by the diffusion of mental
health policy internationally.
Conclusion
In the past decades many countries have initiated exten-
sive mental health care system reforms, and the main
goal of these reforms is to transfer curative treatment
for the mentally ill from psychiatric hospitals to the
community. In many countries, structural reforms have
been guided by mental health policies. But mental health
policies are not, in and of themselves, necessarily “good”;
the true measure of national health governance lies in
the configuration and performance of mental health sys-
tems. Institutional theorists have argued that practices
are adopted solely for symbolic reasons if the legitimacy
they confer are “decoupled” from routine, technical
activities of the organization [1,54]. Yet an equally plau-
sible claim is that institutionalized forms of practice
evolved from technical forms of practice [58,180].
Public health studies have demonstrated that commu-
nity treatment models are more effective than hospital
treatment models in that they can reduce the number of
relapses and hospital admissions and shorten average
length of stay [181-183]. Close monitoring of patient
status and their adherence to treatment have also been
demonstrated as effective ways to help people with
serious mental illness integrate into the community
[184,185]. However, alongside the research supporting
these reforms is research showing the negative, often
unintended, consequences of deinstitutionalization based
on outcomes such as increase in the mortality or
“Revolving Door Syndrome” [95,96,186,187]. Psychiatric
care is not divorced from other spheres of medical and
social services, and therefore sound health service plan-
ning requires cooperation among constituents and sec-
tors in order to adequately address the global burden of
MNS disorders.
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aThe terms ‘institutionalization’ and ‘deinstitutiona-
lization’ have specific denotations in different analytical
communities. According to Selznick ([2]:17), institu-
tionalization is a process by which structures or activities
become “infused with value beyond the technical require-
ments at hand”. The phenomenon of institutionalization
can be observed as “the emergence of orderly, stable,
socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely orga-
nized, or narrowly technical activities” ([188]:238). We
adopt this particular, theoretical meaning of institutio-
nalization. The meaning of deinstitutionalization is one
we invoke from the public health literature: the practice of
caring for individuals in the community rather than in an
institutional environment, with resultant effects on the
individual patient, the individual’s family, the community,
and the healthcare system [189,190]. This is related to the
definition of deinstitutionalization found in the orga-
nization sociology literature, or the erosion or discon-
tinuity of an institutionalized organizational activity or
practice, but not one we refer to directly in this article
[191,192]. In summary, in this study institutionalization
entails the integration of deinstitutionalization practices
and structures into existing sources such as policy and
law, professional development, and industry norms.
bAs an extension of this statement, early adopters do
not have a strong reason to broadcast pilot information
unless the international community sanctioned their
choices in the first place [193].
cWe would expect changes in the mix of mental health
care facilities as well; specifically an increase in out-
patient and day treatment facilities and a decrease in
community-based psychiatric inpatient facilities, com-
munity residential facilities, and mental hospitals. We
did not, however, examine these outcomes due to data
quality.
dLegitimacy can be garnered from a vast array of sources
external or internal to the organization. External sources
include licensing boards, credential bodies, accreditation
bodies, funding agencies, epistemic communities, pro-
fessional associations, unions, rating agencies, business
consortiums, public opinion polls, and the media. And
internal sources include workers, managers, human re-
source specialists, and board members. These sources
could operate independently or jointly to rate the legiti-
macy of a given organization.
eThe WHO Pyramid Framework advocates for the
most numerous services to be offered by informal com-
munity mental health organizations, followed by primary
care settings, general hospitals, formal community men-
tal health organizations, and lastly specialist mental
health services [79].
fTorrey [82] remarked on how most of those who were
deinstitutionalized from public psychiatric hospitals inthe United States were severely mentally ill. Between 50
and 60 percent of those discharged were diagnosed with
schizophrenia, another 10 to 15 percent were diagnosed
with manic-depressive illness and severe depression, and
an additional 10 to 15 percent were diagnosed with
organic brain diseases –epilepsy, stroke, Alzheimer's
disease, and brain damage secondary to trauma. The
remaining individuals residing in public psychiatric hos-
pitals had conditions such as mental retardation with
psychosis, autism and other psychiatric disorders of
childhood, and alcoholism and drug addiction with con-
current brain damage.
gCommunity mental health services constitute the foun-
dation of the mental health system; this category encom-
passes case management, forensic community outreach
teams, home treatment, rehabilitation, crisis resolution,
court diversion schemes, hostels, psychiatric rehabilitation
villages in rural areas, Assertive Community Treatment,
and other ancillary services. Outpatient clinics have a
triage function of assessing patient condition, referring pa-
tients to specialists if so needed, and providing follow-up
care. And finally, inpatient care, in the form of psychiatric
emergency services or short-term hospitalization, is in
place to prevent long-term institutional placement. In-
patient care settings provide vigorous treatment and
monitoring during acute episodes, thus allowing for con-
tinuing care in other settings between episodes.
hCommunity-based services include, but are not limited
to, vocational training, supported employment, family
care-giving, psychiatric beds outside mental hospitals (e.g.
in general hospitals), day care services, residential care in
the community, mobile clinics, outreach services, self-help
and user groups, and mental health services delivered
electronically.
iInter-sectorial collaboration is not mentioned but is
equally, if not more, important in mental health care. Full
social participation for people with MNS disorders re-
quires sustained access to jobs, schools, and other ser-
vices; this requires cooperation among education, social
services, labor, and justice sectors. Also outside the pur-
view of this study are providers of therapeutic interven-
tions outside of biomedical institutions, such as shamans,
traditional healers, and priests.
jThe count and rate of five types of mental health facil-
ities would also be suitable candidates, but they were
collected for the 2011 wave only. The types of facilities are
outpatient facilities, day treatment facilities, community-
based psychiatric inpatient facilities, community residential
facilities, and mental hospitals.
kThe quality of bed management depends on the avail-
ability and usage of concomitant resources available,
such as home assessment, clinical gatekeepers for admis-
sions, clear records of each admission, mental health
team continual assessment, inpatient case meetings, and
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beds should be prioritized for seriously mentally ill pa-
tients, variously defined as those who have had multiple
admissions in the past, been legally detained, and/or failed
to adhere to treatment and prescribed regimens.
lThe year of initial adoption of national mental health
policy was compiled based on a triangulation of Atlas,
WHO-AIMS, and MiNDbank. Data for WHO-AIMS
were collected by a team led by a focal point in each re-
spondent country and were, in most cases, approved by
its Ministry of Health [116]. MiNDbank features histor-
ical mental health policies, plans, strategies, and legisla-
tion, along with international and regional treaties, for
150 countries [118].
mThe five components of mental health policy as-
sessed are advocacy, promotion, prevention, treatment,
and rehabilitation.
nA national mental health plan describes the course of
action. It also indicates what has to be done, who has to
do it, during what time frame and with what resources.
A mental health law lays out the recriminations for the
failure to carry out the terms of the plan.
oPublic financing for health is generally derived from
taxation, government-owned insurance schemes, for-
profit and non-profit donors, and grants.
pThis overlaps with seven conditions the WHO has
identified as priority conditions. They are depression,
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, suicide,
epilepsy, dementia, disorders due to use of alcohol, dis-
orders due to use of illicit drugs, and mental disorders
in children. They were identified as priority conditions
on the basis that they represent a high burden of mor-
tality, morbidity, and disability; incurred large eco-
nomic costs; or were associated with violations of
human rights. The WHO mhGAP initiative has come
up with an integrated package of interventions for
each condition [143].
qIt also deserves mention, though not reported in the
tables, that the expected log mental hospital bed rates
for countries with mental health policy have a 0.17 lower
probability (p = 0.004) than non-adopting countries. The
same relationship is observed for general hospital bed
rates, though lower in magnitude and it did not reach
significance (−0.017; p-value-0.902). Overall bed rates
did not reach significance and displayed a coefficient in
the opposite direction (0.04; p-value = 0.744).
rIn robustness checks not shown, we created dummy
variables for the four national income categories, re-ran
the multivariable models with them, and made side-by-
side comparisons of the results from using the ordinal
or nominal variable. We found statistically significant
differences for low income (p <0.10) and lower-middle
income (p <0.05) versus countries of other income status
when it comes to mental hospital bed rate changes. Wefound statistically significant difference for general hos-
pital bed rate changes in countries belonging to upper-
middle income (p <0.10) and upper income (p <0.10)
relative to countries of other income status. And finally, we
found statistically significant difference for overall hospital
bed rate changes among countries belonging to upper-
middle income (p <0.05) and upper income (p <0.05) rela-
tive to countries of other income status.
sThere is extant research focusing on providers and pa-
tients. Provider-specific studies compare hospital and
community settings using cross-sectional designs, com-
pare types of providers or service models to divert people
from hospital admissions, or estimate cost-effectiveness
variations among these modalities. Patient-specific studies
tend to follow people and measure changes in their clin-
ical profile and quality of life as they experience episodes
of decompensation and treatment, and make the tran-
sition from the residence in psychiatric facilities to the
community.
tResources are bundles of inputs used to promote
health, combining staff, monetary capital, medications and
other consumables. Outputs are volumes and qualities of
prevention, treatment, care and rehabilitation services
yielded. Outcomes are gauged in terms of symptom alle-
viation, changes in behavioral patterns, personal and social
functioning, improved quality of life (including for fa-
milies), and perhaps some wider social consequences to
each individual service user.
uWe did not use components of mental health policy
as the main predictor variables because the Atlas dataset
contains information for them in the 2005 wave only.
The release of WHO MiNDbank would infuse data
filling this information void.
vThe five countries in the innovator category are
Argentina, Czech Republic, Japan, Kuwait, and Singapore.
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